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1 Introduction
Humans often lie strategically. For instance, governments sometimes need to impose restric-
tions, new taxes and costly reforms on citizens or groups of citizens. In turn, unpopular
reforms can lead to tax evasion, political instability and social unrest, with dramatic conse-
quences for both governments and citizens. In many cases such bitter medicine seems to be
better accepted if the government can pretend that a third party shares the responsibility of
the restrictions. If we watch back in time only to the period that followed the Asian 1995
crisis, international organizations such as the IMF or the European Union have often been
called to play this "scapegoat" role. In some cases, it might pay for the government to set
up a third party only to delegate it the right to collect some of the less popular taxes. It
might then become interesting for the policymaker to claim that the most diﬃcult reforms
or taxes are imposed by the third party, while he is the true initiator. There are many exam-
ples in business or private life where strategic communication serves as a tool for leveraging
negotiation power.
The ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982) provides a natural framework for analyzing such
interaction. In the standard experimental setup, the two players are referred by the intuitive
nicknames Proposer and Responder. The former is endowed with an amount of money and
must make an oﬀer over how to divide this sum between them. The Responder can accept
the oﬀer, in which case the allocation is implemented as such, or reject it, in which case
both players receive nothing. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with pure self-interest
predicts that Responders should accept any positive amount. This result has been falsified
by an impressive number of tests (Roth, 1995). As documented by Oosterbeek et al. (2004)
in a meta-analysis performed on 37 papers, Proposers oﬀer in average no less than 40% of the
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pie; also, 16% of the oﬀers are rejected.1 These results have been interpreted as evidence
in favor of a fairness concern specific to human beings (Camerer, 2003).
In order to address the tax (costly reform) issue in a straightforward way, we develop
a variant of the ultimatum game where the roles of players are inverted, i.e., a power-to-
take game, as referred to by Bosman and van Winden (2002). In the baseline scenario,
at the outset of the game, the first player — we call him Receiver — gets an endowment.
Another player, called Sender, can tax him a part of this amount. At the end of the game,
the first player can either accept this allocation, or reject it thus bringing payoﬀs of both
players down to zero. We then introduce a third agent able to levy his own tax on Receiver,
called Computer and played by the computer itself, which can be seen as the "scapegoat"
international organization. In our game, there is no scope for cooperation between Computer
and Sender.
The two human players — Receiver and Sender — have similar preferences, while Computer
is a representation of external random factors beyond the reach of the former ones. Receiver
knows the statistical distribution of Computer’s moves, but does not know the actual amount
taxed. Sender has full information about the move of the machine. He must send a message
to Receiver, informing him about this amount, but htis message is unverifiable. At the
time when Receiver must decide whether to accept or not the allocation, he will know the
amount left in his hands after the successive interventions of the computer and Sender, and
has the information sent by Sender about the amount taken by the computer. Sender’s
strategic advantage over Receiver is twofold: he moves first (after the computer) and has
full information about his position in the game. Receiver’s negotiation power stems from
his ability to turn down the oﬀer submitted by the Sender, at a cost for himself.2 Like
1 See Bearden (2001) for an almost exhaustive survey of the litterature on this game.
2 This is diﬀerent from the "reverse ultimatum game" by Gneezy et al. (2003) where the Proposer has
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in a standard ultimatum game, we expect Receiver to reject "unfair" oﬀers; knowing this,
Sender should make oﬀers that Receiver accepts. If we push forward the parallel with policy
reforms, a government should be concerned by the political acceptance of any reform; if not,
it may find out that people can reject, sometime in the street, any measure perceived as
unfair.
The paper contributes to the growing experimental literature on lying and deception
initiated by Gneezy (2005). He submits an interesting typology of lies with respect to players’
payoﬀs. If the lie, defined as misrepresentation of reality, brings about an improvement in
both players’ well-being, we have a "Pareto white lie"; if Sender is worse-oﬀ but Receiver is
better-oﬀ — we have "an altruistic white lie". If Sender is better-oﬀ while Receiver is worse-oﬀ,
this is the typical "selfish lie", which Gneezy (2005) acknowledges to be the most relevant
category for many economic events. Taking stock from an Seder-Receiver experiment, he
shows that a non negligible number of senders lie to reap some profit, even if this involve
a loss for receivers (39% lied if the trade-oﬀ is 1$ to 1$: the proportion rises to 52% if the
trade-oﬀ is 10$ to 10$); subjects’ inclination to lie increases if they can get more from the
lie, and decreases the more the others lose from it. In his analysis, gains are predetermined,
and the individual can choose the "size" of the lie accordingly. Our analysis focuses on
the reverse causality: we ask whether people who lie more, do so strategically, in order to
increase their gain. Several other recent papers propose a deeper introspection in the aversion
to lying or subjective lying costs (e.g., Lundquist, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2009; Erat and
Gneezy, 2011; Hurkens and Kartick, 2009; Sánchez-Pagés, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006, 2010; Hao and Houser, 2011).
A first power-to-take game (they call it a demand ultimatum game) with imperfect infor-
a menu of oﬀers, and can submit them until the Responder acccepts one, or can stop the game and set the
payoﬀs to zero.
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mation was analyzed by Mitzkewiz and Nagel (1993). An experiment closely related to ours
— combining a standard ultimatum game with imperfect information with a message game —
was submitted by Croson et al. (2003). In that paper, pairs of subjects play four times an
ultimatum game with an outside option for responders if they reject proposers’ oﬀer, under
various information treatments; more precisely, subjects have known and unknown informa-
tion about the size of the pie and the outside option. In one unknown treatment, proposers
know the size of the pie, actually one of four possible values, while responders know only that
it can be anything between two given bounds (10 to 50), without a precise description of the
statistical distribution (players are thus submitted to ambiguity). They also allow for players
to submit messages between them, and use a dummy variable to record a misleading/true
message. At diﬀerence with their study, in our experiment players have inverted roles and
receivers know the exact statistical distribution of senders’ endowment. Proposers’ lies are
measured by the diﬀerence between the claimed and the actual amount, not by a dummy
variable.
The main research questions are:
• What are the communication strategies in this special variant of the ultimatum game?
• What is the (subjective) value of a rational lie? More precisely, for 1 euro of diﬀerence
between the true and the communicated amount (1 euro lie), how much additional
money do Senders aim to put in their pockets (in average)?
2 The Experiment
2.1 Design
We run four sessions in the interval from March to May 2011 (see Table 1). All sessions were
performed at the Behavioral Research Lab of ESSEC Business School, with a total number
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of 44 participants. Subjects were recruited from the student population of the school, who
answered to a call for paid decision experiments. The experimental design was presented
via computer interface and all interactions were computerized. The program was written in
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each subject was assigned at random with a PC terminal. We
make sure that no subject has participated more than once in this experiment. The whole
procedure was common knowledge.
Players played the game here below [steps 1 to 6] for six rounds. In order to avoid
repetition eﬀects, the pairs of participants were randomly re-matched at each round; the
roles (either Sender or Receiver) were also draw at random at the outset of each round.
The main steps are listed below:
Step 1. A the beginning of the party, Receiver (called Player 1) gets 100 experimental
currency units (we call them "yens" and inform the students that the actual exchange rate
will be 100 yens : 2 euro cash).
The two agents introduced before, Computer (played by the computer itself) and Sender
(an anonymous human, called Player 2) will be allowed to withdraw, one after the other,
some money from this budget. The Receiver will observe only the funds left at the end of
the game.
Step 2. The computer takes a random amount Y ; The draw has a uniform distribution
on the support [0; 50].
Step 3. Sender learns Y.
Step 4. He sends a messageM to Receiver informing him about the amount Y. IfM = Y,
he tells the truth, if M 6= Y, he lies. We will distinguish latter on between a self-interested,
rational lie M > Y and an "irrational lie", M < Y.
Step 5. He (Sender) then takes for himself an amount Z (Z ∈ [0; 100− Y ])
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Step 6. Receiver gets the message M and observes the amount left in his hands: R =
100 − (Y + Z). He must decide whether to accept or reject the oﬀer of the Sender. If he
accepts, the amounts are due; if else, both players get nothing.
Table 1 presents the experience schedule. We run four sessions, two with a warm-up test,
two without warming-up. In the warm-up test, the amount Y taken by the computer (at
random in the interval [0, 50]) is public information. Since Y is known, the sender does not
need to issue any message, he just has to decide on his tax Z, given the amount Y. Players
play this game for six rounds, before moving to the basic imperfect information set-up (steps
1-6).
"With warming-up" condition "Without warming-up" condition
Session 1 Session 3 Session 2 Session 4
N=10 subjects N=12 subjects N=10 subjects N=12 subjects
March 2, 2011 April 29, 2011 April 6, 2011 May 18, 2011
Table 1. Experience schedule
At the end of the experiment, participants received the income of all periods. One virtual
currency unit translated into 0.2 euros. In the "with warming-up" condition the experiment
took about 60 minutes, and the average income was 14.36€.
2.2 Basic statistics
Table 1 displays the basic average values.
Overall sample Accepted oﬀers Rejected oﬀers
Nb Z + Y Z(100−Y ) Nb Z + Y
Z
(100−Y ) Nb Z + Y
Z
(100−Y )
With warming-up 66 68.7 0.58 52 66.9 0.56 14 75.2 0.66
Without warming-up 66 62.2 0.50 52 58.5 0.47 14 76.1 0.64
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Table 2. Average amount (Z + Y ) and ratio Z/(100− Y )
The average amounts (Z + Y ), 68.7 and respectively 62.2, are statistically diﬀerent be-
tween the two conditions - with and without warm-up (t = 2, 86, p < 0.05), while the average
Y drew by the computer is almost identical (24.5 vs. 24.1). As expected, whatever the
design, accepted oﬀers are in average better than rejected ones.
Figures 1 and 2 present the scatter diagram of Z with respect to Y . In the warming-up
condition, the cloud of observations is tight, illustrative of a better understanding of the
problem by subjects.
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Figure 1: Scatter diagram: Z (amount taken by Sender) on Y (amount taken by Computer)
with warming-up
Figure 3 and 4 shows the message M (about Y), for given Y, firstly in the no warm-up
condition, then in the warm-up condition. In both conditions most observations lie on or
above the 45◦ line, thus indicating the tendency to overestimate the amount taken by the
computer.
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Figure 2: Scatter diagram: Z (amount taken by Sender) on Y (amount taken by Computer)
without warming-up
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Figure 3: Scatter diagram: M (amount claimed to be taken by Computer) on Y (amount
actually taken by Computer) with warming-up
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Figure 4: Scatter diagram: M (amount claimed to be taken by Computer) on Y (amount
actually taken by Computer) without warming-up
2.3 Empirical communication strategies
If there is a cost of lying, some Senders might be tempted to overstate the amount taken
by the Computer, in order to manipulate Receiver’s expectations, and submit less generous
oﬀers. In other words, they would "hide behind the Computer’s action" in order to implement
a more self-interested action. This outcome can arise only if there are honest Senders, who
will tell the truth. The very presence of these honest persons opens the door for others to
misbehave (become liars). According to this basic logic, only two categories of persons should
exist: honest persons and liars that exaggerate the amount deducted by the computer.
A surprise came with the existence of third category, the "irrational player", who under-
state the amount taken by the computer. By so doing, they not only bear the cost of lying
(we will rule out the possibility of getting some pleasure from telling lies), but also make the
Receiver believe that the "remaining pie" is larger than the actual pie; The sender should
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now tax a lower amount.
For each of the three observed empirical strategies we report in Table 3 the number of
times it has occurred (n), the average absolute deviation and the relative deviation. The
average absolute deviation is the average diﬀerence between the message and the actual
amount taken by the computer. The relative deviation is the sum of the diﬀerences between
the message and the true draw, over the sum of true draws.
With warming-up Without warming-up
TYPE Strategy n Av. abs. dev. Rel. dev. n Av. abs. dev. Rel. dev.
Liar M > Y 43 13.37 0.59 43 11.35 0.48
Honest M = Y 11 0 0 15 0 0
Irrational M < Y 12 -7.58 -0.25 8 -10.25 -0.28
Table 3: Empirical strategies: Basic statistics
We notice that in both experiments, in 43 over 66 interactions (or 65%) the Sender has
decided to overstate the amount taken by the computer. The selfish lie is therefore the
preferred strategy.
The Sender told the truth 11 times (15 times) in the "with warming-up" condition (re-
spectively without warming-up).
The 12+8=20 irrational choices were made by only 13 players (who played the role of
the Sender three times each). We cannot connect their behavior to the amount taken be the
computer. Notice that of the 13 players making an irrational choice, 7 ended up by playing
the rational lie or honesty strategy at the last round, and only 6 still played the irrational
strategy. Probably these players had some diﬃculties in understanding the problem.
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2.4 The (subjective) value of selfish lies
In order to get an indication of the consequences of lies on the amount taken by the Sender,
we can run a regression on Z, the amount taken by Sender, of the amount taken by the
computer Y and the diﬀerence between the message and the actual amount (M − Y ), for
each observation k:
Model 1: Zk = C − aYk + b(Mk − Yk) + k (1)
Of course, observations collected for one individual over six rounds are not independent (they
are independent only within one round), thus such a regression (with pooled data) should
be seen only as a rough attempt to extract common coeﬃcients.
The coeﬃcient a indicates the response of the Sender to a one unit increase in the tax
taken by the computer, independent of the communication strategy. The coeﬃcient b mea-
sures the "pure" lie eﬀect, i.e., what are the consequence on Z of a one unit lie, M − Y = 1,
when controlling by for the size of the amount taken by the computer.
In order to detect the specific impact of the lies on Z for the two categories of liars
(rational and irrational), we also create two dummy variables, DUMLIE that takes value 1
for M > Y and 0 if else, and DUMIR that takes the value of 1 for M < Y and 0 if else.
Model 2 allows to identify the specific impact on Z of each type of lie (selfish-rational and
accidental-irrational).
Model 2: Zk = C − aYk + ρDUMLIE ∗ (Mk − Yk) + γDUMIR ∗ (Mk − Yk) + k (2)
Like in model 1, the coeﬃcient a indicates the response of the Sender to a one unit
increase in the tax taken by the computer, independent of the communication strategy. The
coeﬃcient ρ indicates the pure eﬀect of a selfish lies, and the coeﬃcient γ measures the pure
eﬀect of an accidental lie.
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With warming-up Without warming-up
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
C 55.17*** 50.06*** 41.23*** 40.38***
Y −0.529*** −0.458*** −0.248** −0.238**
(M − Y ) 0.223** — 0.384*** —
DUMLIE ∗ (M − Y ) — 0.429*** — 0.426***
DUMIR ∗ (M − Y ) — −0.715** — 0.189ns
R2 0.49 0.56 0.29 0.30
R2-adjusted 0.47 0.54 0.27 0.26
F-statistic 30.64 27.02 13.27 8.86
Nb. obs 66 66 66 66
Table 4. Estimates of Models 1 and 2 depending on the condition (with / without warm-up
game)
(*** statistical significant at 1%, ** statistical significant at 5%; ns - not significant)
A reading of the coeﬃcient a indicates that for every additional yen taken by the
Computer, all other things equal, Sender will reduce his own tax, but by less
than one yen (between 0.238 and 0.529, depending on the model). Hence the total
amount available to Receiver declines for every additional euro taken by the computer.
The undiﬀerentiated eﬀect of a lie (coeﬃcient b) is positive in both experiments. When
the Sender exaggerates the amount taken by the computer by 1 yen, he does so in order to
tax 0.22 (respectively 0.38) more yens.
The eﬀect is stronger in model 2, where we can isolate the impact of selfish lies: the
coeﬃcient ρ is large and statistically significant: for those Senders who choose the
12
selfish lie strategy, for every additional currency unit of lie, they tax the Receiver
an additional 0.43 units.
3 Conclusion
A government might be limited in his ability to tax or impose costly reforms by a popular
rejection of what can be seen as an unfair distribution of wealth. However, citizens might
accept higher taxes if some of them are levied by a third party, for instance a supranational
organization. If such an external agent exists, a manipulating government might even claim
that reforms are actually imposed by this organization while he would be the true initiator.
In order to analyze these complex strategies, this paper develops a power-to-take game
(a variant of the ultimatum game): firstly one player receives an endowment, then another
player can levy a tax on this amount. We show that, under perfect information, this special
game leads to similar pie sharing strategies as the normal ultimatum game: those who submit
the oﬀer would keep for them no more than 60% of the pie.
The experiment carried out at the ESSEC Experimental Lab revealed three empirical
communication strategies. The most frequent strategy (2/3 of the total interactions) is the
selfish lie, where Sender overestimates (by about 50%) the amount taken by the computer.
A simple regression model shows that for every additional currency unit of lie, Sender will
raise his intake by 0.43 currency units. Some players will tell the truth, and, some other will
underestimate the amount taken by the computer. This latter strategy is hard to understand
in this context.
In the framework of the tax tale, if only the tax-setter has complete information about
the tax collected by the third party, he can use this information strategically. In particular,
Sender (tax-setter) would inflate the actual amount levied by the computer, just in order to
push down Receiver’s (taxpayer) expectations about the amount left to be shared. This will
13
allow the sender to submit a less advantageous oﬀer for the receiver.
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4 Annex. Basic instructions
Screen 1 : General information
Good Morning,
Thank you for participating to this study.
Please read carefully the following instructions. If you have any question, please call the
administrator and ask him the question.
Incentives:
In this experiment, you will be paid according to your performance in the game. Monetary
payoﬀs are denominated in "Laboratory Yen". When calculating your take-home gain, the
exchange rate is 50 Yens = 1 euro.
Game description:
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You will be submitted to a decision problem, involving a partner chosen at random in
the group and involving a random decision taken by the computer.
Individuals in the pair are referred to as Player 1 and Player 2, according to there role
in the experiment.
Roles change at each round. At the beginning of each round, your new role will be
indicated. Please be to careful to this indication.
Pairs are reset at each round. You will never play twice the same role in a game with the
same player.
Screen 2: The basic sequence
Step 0: At the beginning of the game, Player 1 receives a fixed amount of 100 Yens.
Step 1: The computer takes a random amount equal to Y Yens. Y is selected at random
among all integers between 0 and 50. Every integer has the same probability (1/50) to be
chosen.
Step 2a: The amount Y is communicated to Player 2.
Step 2b: Player 2 can now take an amount equal to Z Yens (an integer between 0 and
100-Y).
At the end of these first steps, endowments are:
• Player 1 : S Yens (with S is the residual amount of the initial endowment after the
two withdrawals S=100-Y-Z)
• Computer : Y Yens
• Player 2 : Z Yens
Step 3a: Player 1 knows S (his endowment after the two withdrawals).
Step 3b: Depending on the treatment, an information more or less reliable is provided to
Player 1 about the amount Y taken by the computer.
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Step 3c: Player 1 must decide if he accepts or not the residual endowment:
• If he accepts it, both players receive the amounts defined above
• If he rejects it, both players receive 0.
Screen 3a: Instructions for Player 1
You are Player 1.
Step 0: At the beginning of the game, you receive a fixed amount of 100 Yens.
Step 1: The computer takes a random amount equals to Y Yens. Y is selected at random
among all integers between 0 and 50. Each integer has the same probability (1/50) to be
chosen.
Step 2: Player 2 takes an amount on your initial endowment (an integer between 0 and
R=100-Y)
At this step, Player 2 knows:
• The amount Y taken by the computer
• The message M that he will provide to you about the value of the amount taken
by the computer.
Step 3: You observe:
• The value of S=100-Y-Z
• The signal M provided to you by Player 2 about the amount Y taken by the com-
puter. Player 2 can chose this message strategically.
Step 4: You decide if you accept or not the endowment S.
• If you accept, both players receive the amounts defined above.
• If you reject, both players receive 0.
Screen 3b: Instructions for Player 2
You are Player 2.
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Step 0: At the beginning of the game, Player 1 receives a fixed amount of 100 Yens.
Step 1: The computer takes a random amount equal to Y Yens. Y is selected at random
among all integers between 0 and 50. Each integer has the same probability (1/50) to be
chosen.
Step 2: You receive the following information:
• The amount Y taken by the computer (This amount will not be known by Player
1 when he will make his decision)
• The message M that he will send you about the amount taken by Computer.
You have to:
• Decide about the value M that you are going to communicate to Player 1 about
the amount taken by the computer
• Take an amount Z on the endowment of the Player 1 (an integer between 1 and
100-Y)
Step 3: Player 1 receives the following information:
• The value of the amount left S=100-(Y+Z)
• The message M that you provided about the amount Y taken by the computer.
He has to decide if he accepts or not the endowment S
• If he accepts it, you receive the amount Z and he receives the amount S.
• If he rejects it, both players receive 0.
Screen 4: Decision of Player 2
You are Player 2.
Player 1 has received 100 Yens.
Computer has taken an amount equal to Y Yens.
You can now take an amount Z on the residual endowment of Player 1.
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You have to choose between all integers between 1 and R=100-Y.
At the end, Player 1 will decide if he accepts or rejects your oﬀer. In this last case, gains
of both Players will be zero.
You can now take an amount between 1 and R=(100-Y)= [R] Yens
To decide, you have the following information:
The amount taken by computer is Y=[Y] Yens
To decide, Player 1 will have the following information:
- The residual endowment after the two withdrawals (S=100-Y-Z)
- The amount M that you are going to communicate him about the amount taken by
Computer.
Please decide:
a/ Which value of the amount taken by the Computer do you want to communicate to
Player 1? M=[M]
b/ Which amount do you want to take? Z=[Z]
Screen 5: Decision of Player 1
You have received a fixed amount of 100 Yens.
The computer has randomly taken an amount and Player 2 did the same.
After these two withdrawals, your residual endowment is: S= [S] Yens.
Player 2 indicates you that the amount taken by the computer was: [M] yens
You have to decide if you accept this oﬀer or not. If you reject it, both you and Player 2
will get nothing..
Please decide:
You accept the oﬀer/ You reject the oﬀer.
Screen 6a: Results Player 1
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Results:
Your final endowment was S=[S] yens.
You have accepted/rejected the oﬀer.
Your earning is equal to [S] Yens/0 Yen.
Screen 6b: Results Player 2
Results
You took [Z] yens
Player 1 has accepted./rejected your oﬀer.
Your earning is equal to [Z] yens/0 yen.
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